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Introduction
The European Union (EU) enlargement not only shaped the modern political
and economic appearance of the expanded Europe, but also tested the demo-
cratic legitimacy of the integration machinery, since it assumed the importa-
tion of the vast European democratic heritage into candidate countries.
Gradually, results of this endeavor were reflected in member states and candi-
date countries and in ‘non-applicant’ countries, such as Ukraine, which asso-
ciate themselves with the enlarged Europe and have thereby embarked upon
the drift away from the old legacy of Socialism.
Among the countries which are studied in this book, Ukraine is distin-
guished by the strongest communist legacy, a dubious honor. The Ukrainian
Soviet Socialist Republic was one of the most important political, military
and industrial bastions of the USSR. In fact, Ukraine had for many years
enjoyed a dominant political position in Moscow among other Soviet
republics. Two General Secretaries of the Soviet Communist Party came from
Ukraine. The process of democratization in Ukraine started shortly after
gaining independence in 1991, and was supported by the newly emerging
political elite, which mainly included former leaders of the Ukrainian Party
(Kravchuk) and recognized leaders of the National Movement (Rukh). As a
priority, Ukraine set a political objective of integration into international
political and economic structures and, consequently, the achievement of
membership of the Council of Europe and the EU. Once the Council of
Europe and the EU established criteria for achieving that goal, substantive
attempts were launched to prove the conformity of Ukraine’s political and
legal systems in the spheres of democracy and human rights. However, the
efforts of change agents in the country have met strenuous resistance from
veto players, who defended their privileged political and economic positions
at the expense of democratic reforms and the rule of law. The fact that the EU
never endorsed the possibility of Ukraine becoming a full member state
further undermined the chances of change agents gathering sufficient
strength to promote deep liberalization changes in Ukrainian society. The EU
policy of strict conditionality without any prospect of membership hampered
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rule adoption and rule implementation of western democratic values in
Ukraine. At the same time veto players in Ukraine could credibly advocate
alternatives to EU integration, particularly closer alignment with a resurgent
Russia.
The objective of this chapter is to analyze democratic rule of law reforms
in Ukraine in the five sectors, and to evaluate whether and to what degree, if
at all, external actors – and especially the EU – has managed to affect rule of
law reforms in Ukraine, using the EUCLIDA analytical framework. We will
scrutinize the positive and negative role of international actors in the process of
rule adoption, rule implementation, and rule internalization of democratic
rule of law. Attention will be paid to specific features of the Ukrainian polit-
ical and legal environment which imply certain specifications in the imple-
mentation of democratic rule of law standards in Ukraine. It is argued that
the major specification is the historical and ethnic split of the Ukrainian
nation, which led to never-ending conflict between change agents and veto
players on the main issues of democratic rule of law reforms in Ukraine. The
time frame of our analysis embraces the period from Ukrainian independence
in 1991 to the post-Orange Revolution era in 2004–06. The remainder of the
introduction will present a general overview of the Ukrainian political scene
since 1991 with a focus on the main political actors who form change agents
and veto players’ camps. The other sections of the chapter will discuss the
democratic rule of law implementation in Ukraine in line with the EUCLIDA
model (see Chapter 2, in this volume).
Modern independent Ukraine inherited many political, economic and
ethnic problems from the former USSR. From the early days of its history
until today Ukraine has been sharply divided by diverging political and
ethnic influences. Such divergence implies political and economic imbal-
ances, which have constantly to be kept in right equilibrium to maintain the
political stability and peaceful coexistence of Ukraine’s multinational society.
From the early days of independence deep geographical divisions between
the west and the east of Ukraine have become apparent. Such divisions have
been engendered by Ukraine’s complex history. Representatives of various
Russian-speaking national minorities populate the industrial east of Ukraine.
The Autonomous Republic of Crimea maintains strong political and cultural
ties with the Russian Federation (until 1963 Crimea was part of the Russian
Federation). The western areas of Ukraine experienced strong political and
cultural influences from Poland and the former Austrian-Hungarian Empire
in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Consequently, the political
life of modern Ukraine reflects a historical kaleidoscope of pro-west and 
pro-east preferences and traditions of multinational Ukraine.
From the early 1990s the Communist Party gained popular support in 
the industrial Russian-speaking east of Ukraine (gaining 20 percent of the
popular vote in the 1994 parliamentary elections and 25 percent in 1998).
The pro-nationalistic party ‘Rukh’ received a significant share of the electorate
in the rural Ukrainian-speaking west (5 percent of the 1994 parliamentary
election votes and 10 percent of those in 1998). To some degree, the 2002
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parliamentary elections highlighted the depth of this geographical split, by
bringing a wider range of political parties into the Verkhovna Rada. Change
agents grouped around the pro-European ‘Our Ukraine’ Party (which won 
30 percent of seats), headed by former Prime Minister Viktor Yuschenko and
the Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc – ‘BUT’ (5 percent of seats). Veto players managed
to create a political coalition around the pro-Russian president party “For
United Ukraine” (25 percent of seats), Communist Party (15 percent), and
Social Democratic Party (5 percent).1 Such a strong representation of non-
liberals inhibited the long awaited acceleration of the rule adoption and
implementation/internalization of internationally recognized democratic
values in Ukraine. The veto players’ coalition supported President Kuchma’s
‘multivector foreign policy’ directed at closer integration both with the EU
and with former Soviet republics. The EU and other international actors
applied the policy of conditionality towards Ukraine, and, therefore, constantly
questioned the credibility of the Ukrainian government by emphasizing its
poor record in human rights protection and in the fight against corruption.
The still unsolved killing of the opposition journalist Georgiy Gongadze
demonstrated the low standards of human rights protection in Ukraine.
However, the kaleidoscope of the ruling elites in Ukrainian society has 
drastically changed since the Orange Revolution in December 2004. On the
one hand, this revolution raised popular concern not only about such issues
as the fight against corruption and economic recovery, but also about more
widespread and effective endorsement of European liberal political values and
alignment with EU rules in particular. On the other hand, the Orange
Revolution has considerably shaken the fragile balance between the
constantly diverging west and east of Ukraine.
From the outset, the newly elected President Victor Yuschenko and his
government, headed by Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko, endeavored to elim-
inate the influence of veto players by making more than 17,000 new appoint-
ments within the executive, security agencies and civil services of people who
claimed support for the pro-western policy of the Ukrainian government. Soon
after the victory of the Orange Revolution the coalition of veto players in the
Verkhovna Rada collapsed. Many of the former coalition members fled to the
change agents’ blocs ‘Our Ukraine’ and ‘BUT’. Major security positions were
distributed between political leaders who took active part in the Revolution and
openly declared their pro-western views. People with a strong pro-western
orientation filled the civil service as well. However, newly appointed pro-west-
ern top executives rarely managed to employ competent civil servants to replace
experienced members of the old administration who retired or were dismissed.
As a result, the efficiency of the executive branch of power immediately
declined in the aftermath of the Orange Revolution. The position of the
government was considerably strengthened by the signing of the EU–Ukraine
Action Plan on 21 February 2005 in Brussels. The Plan was presented to the
Ukrainian public as a step forward in relations between the EU and Ukraine,
and as an expression of the EU’s support for democratic and market reforms in
the post-Orange Revolution Ukraine.
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However, the Action Plan was not welcomed by all political parties in
Ukraine. The fact that it did not provide any prospect of Ukraine’s member-
ship of the EU was loudly criticized by some veto players.2 Furthermore,
President Yuschenko and the Orange Revolution government strongly advo-
cated the need for Ukraine to join NATO as a prerequisite for full EU
membership. However, these initiatives have not been welcomed, especially in
the pro-Russian east of Ukraine. As a result the issue of NATO membership
decreased support for further integration of Ukraine into the EU and deepened
the split in the country between the west and the east.3
The Orange Revolution also affected the balance of external influence 
on processes in Ukraine. The 2006 parliamentary elections sharpened the 
ever-present conflict between pro- and anti-western elites in Ukraine. These
elections reflected new problems in Ukrainian society. Continuing standstill
in economic growth and a worsening of political and economic relations with
Russia, against the background of a rather lukewarm reception by the EU to
Ukrainian integration initiatives, led to dissatisfaction among the Ukrainian
public with the Orange Revolution change agents.4 Pro-western circles
became more and more convinced that the EU is leaving Ukraine all alone
with Russia, at a time when the latter is becoming increasingly authoritarian
domestically, and possessive of the former territories of the USSR, Russia has
been trying to increase its influence over Ukraine, by using first of all the 
‘gas factor’ and making political and business elites doubt the necessity of
pro-European orientation.
The 2006 parliamentary elections opened old wounds and divided Ukraine
geographically, as had happened in the aftermath of Ukrainian independence. 
As a result of these elections veto players gained a significant share of seats in
the Verkhovna Rada (the Party of Regions gained 32 percent of seats and the
unreconstructed Communist Party 3 percent). Change agents grouped
around the “democratic coalition”, which comprised ‘BUT’ (26 percent),
‘Our Ukraine’ (16 percent) and the Socialist Party (5 percent). However, due
to internal disagreements and power ambitions, change agents missed the
opportunity to form the majority coalition for three months after the elec-
tions. This situation led to political and economic instability in the country
and threatened the second parliamentary elections. As a result, the “democratic
coalition” collapsed in July 2006 after the Socialist Party jointed the illiberal
camp and initiated the building of the ‘anti-crisis coalition’ with the Party of
Regions and the Communist Party in summer 2006.
The change in the political balance in the Verkhovna Rada and the 
adoption of new laws, which transferred considerable powers from the
President of Ukraine to the Prime Minister with the so-called ‘Constitutional
reform’ led to a serious constitutional crisis in April 2007. On 2 April 2007
President V. Yuschenko disbanded the Verkhovna Rada and called new
parliamentary elections. After the prolonged political standoff and the risk of
nationwide disturbances, the leaders of the opposing political camps decided
to prevent any possibility of further escalation of the conflict and agreed to
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conduct new parliamentary elections in September 2007.5 The outcome of
these elections served to further emphasize the depth of the political cleavage
between national elites, which was not only maintained, but also deepened by
the ineffectiveness of political institutions and the absence of traditions of
parliamentarianism and democratic politics. In spite of having a relative
majority in the Verkhovna Rada (45.2 percent, but, with a majority of only
two seats), pro-Western parties (‘BUT’ and ‘Nasha Ukraina’) were still unable
to form an effective Parliamentary coalition. In fact, their action has been
constantly blocked by the Party of Regions, which is trying to preserve its
influence in the country by manipulating the constitutional procedures. After
the elections it also became evident that the narrow-minded policies supported
by a few politicians and political forces cannot be kept back by any restraining
institutional mechanism. This forms the systematic drawback of the model of
parliamentary republic which they tried to carry out in Ukraine with the
Constitutional reform. In such a situation of conflict, the actual influence of
external actors decreases significantly, and previous reforms that set up the
basis for developing of democratic standards are called into question.6
Protection of civil freedoms and political rights
One can argue that protection of civil freedoms and political rights was
always guaranteed by the constitutions of the USSR and Soviet Ukraine. 
In these documents the scope of civil freedoms and political rights was 
specified and proclaimed as an attribute of real democracy. However, the
declarative character of these provisions and the lack of correspondence with
the realities of public life were perceived with displeasure by a significant
part of Ukrainian society. In the time of political repressions before
Gorbachov’s perestroika, the issue of human rights acquired a particularly
important value. In the opinion of political dissidents the civil freedoms and
political rights proclaimed in the constitutions of the USSR and Soviet
Ukraine were engendered from western democratic standards of the
supremacy of human rights. Public criticism of the fictitiousness of human
rights declared, and the impossibility of their practical realization in the
conditions of the Soviet regime, was one of the reasons for popular dislike of
the Soviet regime, which collapsed in 1991.
Newly independent Ukraine initiated a political dialogue with the
Council of Europe in 1992. Change agents, who included pro-western polit-
ical elites (mainly opposition political parties), with a clearly defined agenda
for democratic political system based on international standards, advocated
the idea of Ukraine moving beyond general political declarations on democratic
choice and the priority of human rights and launching concrete steps to
ensure practical implementation of these values. The position of the Council
of Europe became a determining external factor in these processes in Ukraine.
In 1995, after joining the Council of Europe, Ukraine took up obligations
which provided real tools for protection for civil freedoms and political
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rights in the country.7 In 1998 Ukraine agreed to political conditionality set
by the EU under the framework of the EU–Ukraine Partnership and
Cooperation Agreement (PCA). This agreement provided that the attainment
of economic objectives (free trade area between Ukraine and the EU) was
dependent on the success of economic and political reforms in Ukraine.
Henceforth, the Council of Europe and the EU played the leading role
among international actors in the course of monitoring the protection of
civil rights and political freedoms by various Ukrainian regimes.8
At various stages, the history of these relationships was rather dramatic.
International organizations, such as the Council of Europe, the EU, and the
OCSE, constantly criticized Ukraine for non-observance of its human rights
obligations. This criticism encouraged and directed the activity of domestic
change agents (human rights NGOs, independent mass media, political oppo-
sition, etc.). It can be emphasized that during that period Russia was not an
alternative model, which would contrast the influence of European standards,
since the Yeltsin administration was also more dependent on the West and at
least partially oriented towards liberalizing market and political reforms.
Ukraine pursued the democratic anchoring to western standards through
the ratification of fundamental conventions of the Council of Europe in the
field of civil rights and political freedoms. However, this process was not
smooth. Before the Orange Revolution the Verkhovna Rada ratified only 
20 out of the 30 basic human rights conventions expected of Council of Europe
members. The refusal to even formally endorse the remaining commitments
can only be reasonably explained as a deliberate restraining of reform processes,
chosen by the government and parliamentary majority at a time when anti-liberal
elements in the Kuchma regime were powerful enough to block the submission
of appropriate draft laws for ratification or even consideration.9
This situation caused constant anxiety in the Council of Europe. The 
resolution of the Parliamentary Assembly of Council of Europe (PACE) No.
1466 and the Recommendation of PACE No. 1722 of October, 5, 2005 noted
that the new Ukrainian government had made progress in reducing the number
of non-observance of human rights obligations, but it continued to delay the
ratification of several important conventions in the field of the protection of
human rights and was not carrying out the actions needed to resolve some
questions in the area of practical realization of those already ratified.
Responding to evolving external pressure from international actors,
President Yuschenko issued an Action Plan on the acceleration of the ratifi-
cation process of the basic Council of Europe conventions in January 2006.
The Plan envisaged the following measures: (a) the signature and ratification
of Council of Europe Treaties in relation to the fight against corruption,
human rights protection, and the strengthening of democratic institutions;
(b) alignment of Ukrainian legislation to European democratic and human
rights standards; and (c) effective implementation of European democratic
and human rights standards by Ukraine (Edict of the President of Ukraine
39/2006).
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However, the continuing political crisis in Ukraine hampered any real
progress towards the realization of this plan. Below we try to focus on major
gains and mishaps in setting democratic rule of law standards in the area of
civil freedoms and political rights in Ukraine.
The new contents
Ukraine’s adoption of European standards of civil and political rights
required not only formal rule adoption (for example, ratification of the
Council of Europe conventions), but also essential efforts to ensure rule
implementation and rule internalization. Hitherto, Ukrainian legislation did
not recognize human rights concepts, such as the right to freedom and
integrity of individuals; prohibition of torture and inhuman treatment; and
the right to privacy. Moreover, from the very beginning, Ukraine faced a
conflict between US and European models regarding the interpretation of the
contents of civil and political rights. This was particularly evident in the fact
that in the early 1990s change agents, such as third sector, oppositional
politicians, journalists, mostly familiarized themselves with the US experi-
ence of democracy (thanks to various educational and information
campaigns), and the idea that the USA was the best example of democracy for
Ukraine was very popular. The US model promoted its legal and constitu-
tional heritage as one of the prime sources of reference for universal civil and
political rights standards to be applied in Ukraine. In addition, the US model
put considerable emphasis on the role of the judiciary, consequently to the
case law of the US courts, as a source of law making, which was not compat-
ible with the civil law traditions existing in Ukraine (McFaul 2007).
On the other hand, the European model advocated the experience of
specific European countries (France, Germany and the UK) and the European
regional organizations (the Council of Europe and the EU) as a prime source
of reference for civil and political rights for Ukraine. This situation caused
certain difficulties for the new generation of Ukrainian judges, lawyers and
politicians in applying US and European legal traditions in their everyday
work. Ukrainian judges have been encouraged to apply the case law of the
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) in their decisions.
Therefore, in the end, the European model has prevailed due to the domi-
nance of the Council of Europe and the EU vis-à-vis other international actors
in Ukraine. The ‘first wave of reforms’ focused on the alignment of the
Ukrainian Civil Code, Civil and Criminal Procedure Codes, information
legislation, election laws, and the legislation on associations of 
citizens with best European standards. The reform of Ukrainian legislation
took place in line with European standards. However, this influence was not
uniform in every field. In some cases new Ukrainian legislation was inspired
by relevant European legislation (Council of Europe, EU), while in other cases
the Ukrainian legislation was influenced by Russian legal standards. For
example, draft laws on peaceful assemblies submitted to the Verkhovna Rada
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in 1997–2004 were strongly influenced by comparable Russian laws. Even
Ukrainian human rights NGO’s were influenced by their Russian, rather
than American or European counterparts. Indeed, the process of legal and
institutional change in Ukraine in the last decade in particular has been 
a multilevel process, influenced by both liberal and illiberal external actors.
Moreover, even where formal rule adoption of Council of Europe and EU
standards did take place, the Kuchma regime largely ensured that formal rule
adoption was not followed by effective rule implementation. In fact, some of
the new laws had provisions which did not improve, but worsened, standards
of civil and political rights in Ukraine. For example, the new Civil Code of
Ukraine contained regulations about unreliable information, which substan-
tially interfered with the activity of the mass media and the implementation
of the right to freedom of expression. The new Criminal Procedure Code,
similarly, contained numerous drawbacks, which made possible arbitrariness
and other infringements in law enforcement. Existence of these legal obstacles
was used by the political opposition, and most actively on the eve of Orange
Revolution as a proof of unwillingness of the Kuchma’s regime to carry 
out the actual implementation of European standards into the Ukrainian
political and legal systems. Hitherto, the most prominent international actors
(the Council of Europe and the EU) still remain concerned about effective
rule implementation of rule of law standards in the area of civil and political
rights, even after the Revolution. International actors expressed their concern
over the lack of decisive steps by the ruling political elite in Ukraine to
reform the judicial system and the key democratic institutions, and that there
was a delay in the ratification of human rights agreements and the arrange-
ment of the national legislation and practice in accordance with them
(Council of Europe 1466/2005).
An additional serious challenge to the process of the ‘Europeanization’ of
Ukraine became the strengthening of the model of ‘sovereign’ or ‘managed’
democracy in Putin’s Russia, which is characterized by a significant constrain
of freedoms and related growth of authoritarianism. This model, which
became a clear, open alternative to the European one, inspired Ukrainian veto
players and hampered the strengthening of human rights protection at the
expense of unhindered executive power.
Abolition of the death penalty: the long search for a decision
The fundamental right to life functioned as the ‘litmus test’ for Ukraine’s
place in international democratic society. This problem was on the periphery
of the political legal discourse during the first years of Ukrainian independ-
ence, remaining a problem of moral, rather than legal value. For the first time
the issue of the abolition of the death penalty became a subject of discussion
during negotiations on Ukrainian membership of the Council of Europe.
Abolition of the death penalty was recognized as one of the primary obligations,
which Ukraine had assumed after joining the Council of Europe. Ukraine’s
delay in abolishing the death penalty led to a considerable increase in 
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pressure from international actors (mainly again the Council of Europe) on
the Ukrainian political regime. International organizations, by means of
numerous programs of technical assistance and grants, encouraged change
agents (pro-western political elites, which comprised opposition political
parties and pro-western intellectuals) to accelerate the abolition of the death
penalty through public opinion and educational programs. The Council of
Europe issued resolutions criticizing the delay in the abolition of the death
penalty in Ukraine. Pro-western members of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine
(the ‘European choice’ bloc) decided to apply to the Constitutional Court of
Ukraine with a request to recognize the death penalty as unconstitutional.
After long deliberations the Constitutional Court of Ukraine decided to
support this request. This decision led to the eventual ratification by the
Verkhovna Rada of Protocol No. 6 (on interdiction of the death penalty) of
the ECHR in April 2000. Among the post-socialist member states of the
Council of Europe, Ukraine was the country where the abolition of the death
penalty took longest. The decision to abolish the death penalty has happened
due to the constant pressure of external agents (Council of Europe, EU). The
political establishment in Ukraine was not ready to achieve this objective
without an external pressure. In conclusion, one may argue that the influence
of external actors on politics in Ukraine does not fully correspond to the
Checkel’s “socialization” process (see Checkel 2005). Instead, it was a more
complex and multilevel process which reflected competing influences of
external agents from the east and west of Ukraine.
Freedom of expression and democracy ‘watchdogs’
Independent mass media and freedom of expression have a special value in the
European model of democracy. The ECHR has recognized the mass media as
a ‘watchdog of democracy’. Unfortunately, freedom of expression became a
key problem in relations between international actors (the Council of Europe
and the EU, and – to a lesser extent – the USA) and the Ukrainian govern-
ment during the authoritarian regime of President Kuchma. Starting from
the mid-1990s the government directly or indirectly (through several
oligarchic families close to President Kuchma) monitored the majority of key
national mass-media groups: censorship existed in different forms, legal guar-
antees of independence of the mass media were essentially limited, and the
state did not carry out any investigations of the murders of journalists. The
practice of the destruction of the independent mass media by the judiciary
became common. For instance, in 1999 alone 2,258 judicial claims against
the mass media and journalists were considered by Ukrainian courts (Misyo
and Petrova 2000). The opposition journalists Georgiy Gongadze and Ygor
Alexandrov were murdered. It became obvious that freedom of expression in
Ukraine was impossible without considerable reforms.
International actors’ strategy to improve standards of freedom of expression
used political and legislative tools. The Council of Europe and the EU issued
political statements urging Ukraine to improve standards of freedom of
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expression in line with best western standards. Practically all PACE
Resolutions established a deterioration of freedom of expression in Ukraine
and demanded a response from the Ukrainian government. Moreover, the
Council of Europe assisted the Verkhovna Rada in examining draft laws on
the subject of compliance with European standards. In addition to these
measures international actors provided considerable technical assistance in
monitoring the situation over freedom of expression. This technical assistance
resulted in the establishment of independent centers on human rights
research, networking activities, and training. As a result of international
actors’ pressure, several important judgments, based on precedents of the
ECHR, were issued in Ukraine, and this actually allowed a neutralization of
the judicial mechanisms of influence on the mass media, and essentially
increased the level of legal protection of Ukrainian journalists. For example, 
only 514 claims against the mass media, totaling 150,000 US$, were submitted
to courts in Ukraine in 2004. One should note that the quantity of claims
against mass media decreased several times in the preceding years.13
The Orange Revolution became a turning point, giving hope for further 
radical changes to improve freedom of expression. However, these hopes had
to meet political realities. Members of the new ‘Orange’ government gained
a notorious reputation for being involved in actions aimed at limiting free-
dom of expression. In October 2005, PACE noted that freedom of expression
reforms in Ukraine are rather slow and that the level of freedom of expres-
sion does not comply with recognized international and European standards
(Council of Europe 1466/2005).
The ECHR: a new engine for protecting human rights
Since joining the Council of Europe as a member in 1995 the European Court of
Human Rights (ECtHR) has enjoyed a significant influence on the development
of the system of protection of human rights in Ukraine. Obviously, the ECtHR
has been one of the most active external change agents for the past ten years (even
if its judgments did not concern Ukraine). In the Sovtransauto-holding v Ukraine
judgment in 2002, the ECtHR established the existence of serious violations of
human rights in the Ukrainian legal system (absence of guarantees on protection
of the right to property, and risks of intervention of the executive power in the
activity of courts). In further judgments the ECtHR raised other important
issues, which required serious legal reforms in Ukraine (Zhukovska 2004, 7–12).
As a result of influence exercised by international actors such as mainly by the
Council of Europe, the Ukrainian courts became more inclined to refer in their
judgments to decisions of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).
This was especially notable in cases involving journalists and mass media as
defendants at the suit of public bodies or civil servants. The ECHR’s commentary
on the meaning of Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights
became the basis of the approach of Ukrainian courts in such cases, which played
a principal role in the strengthening of freedom of speech.
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In conclusion, we highlight the fact that in the area of civil rights and
political freedoms international actors, such as the Council of Europe, the
EU, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and
western democratic governments, especially the two most active governments,
i.e. those of the USA and the UK, successfully achieved good standards in
rule adoption of law. This goal was achieved through the anchoring to 
fundamental conventions on human rights and the provision of technical
assistance to the Ukrainian judiciary. As a result, the new generation of
change agents within the Ukrainian judiciary was formed: a part of the judi-
cial corps, which successfully perceived the values of the European standards
and started their implementation in the consideration of court cases and
significantly influenced the rule adoption of civil rights and political 
freedoms. However, progress in rule implementation and rule internalization
still is to be achieved.
Judicial independence and capacity
The need for a fundamental reform of the Ukrainian judiciary system has
never been questioned. This is because both international actors (the Council
of Europe, the EU, the OSCE, and some established western democracies such
as the USA and the UK) and change agents (pro-western political elites, and
members of political opposition) considered the Soviet model of the judiciary
as a major impediment to the democratic rule of law and rule implementation,
and rule internalization of democratic values in Ukraine.
From the ‘Soviet court’ to … ?
The foundations of judiciary reform in Ukraine were laid in the Concept of
Judiciary Reform approved by the Decree of Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine in
1992 (Decree of Verkhova Rada of Ukraine 2296/1992). The Concept of
Judiciary Reform called for the adoption of a number of framework laws on
the reform of the judiciary system and legal proceedings in the course of 
the next two years, which “had to bring to life democratic ideas of justice
developed by world practice and science” and to “ensure the correspondence
of the judiciary legislation to international agreements ratified by Ukraine”.
Unfortunately, the goals of the Concept of Judiciary Reform were more 
ideological in their nature than legal. As a result, its implementation did not
go further than enhancement of the independence of judges (judicial self-
government) and the creation of the system of specialized economic courts.
In fact, the Soviet-type judiciary was not significantly influenced by these
cosmetic changes. Thus, the foundations of judicial procedures remained
constant, as did the legal conscience of judges, and the whole system of law-
enforcement agencies in Ukraine. Nevertheless, pro-Western political forces
in Ukraine asserted the necessity of radical changes in society, though the
directions of reforms were not precisely clear. The new political elites felt a
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sharp deficiency of constructive ideas concerning the reform of the judiciary.
However, this gap started to fill in rather quickly. A number of western
programs (governmental and non- governmental) targeted the diffusion of
democratic values, the promotion of the best practices of western democracies
with the aim of creating an efficiently functioning judiciary system in
Ukraine. Two basic centers of western influence (the USA and Europe) have
emerged. In practice, the geographical origin of such influences was not so
important. However, these two different centers of influence entailed certain
legal complications and contradictions for the evolving Ukrainian judicial
system. The issue of diverse legal influences came to the top of the Ukrainian
legal reform agenda when the Ukrainian government began negotiations to
join the Council of Europe in 1992. At this time intensive internal discussion
about the optimal model of court procedure and the judiciary system in
Ukraine was launched. It was the first time that Ukrainian decision-makers
had faced the rule adoption problem. Henceforth, change agents, such as
political forces of pro-western orientation and, although partially, a few
members of magistracy, contemplated which democratic examples are most
suitable for Ukraine. The “third sector” in Ukraine was too weak yet to take
full part in the discussion on these issues. The development of the new
Constitution stimulated a search for the most appropriate models of justice,
which could guide Ukraine to establish a modern and democratic judiciary. 
As a whole, the lack of institutionalization of international actors in Ukrainian
society and the vagueness of democratic values led to a failure of those change
agents to promote western democratic values in the Ukrainian judiciary at the
time of adopting the new Constitution in 1996. Traditional judicial conservatism,
hardened by the traditions of the Soviet court, prevented Ukrainian judges from
appreciating these ideas and applying them in their practice.
Legitimacy of the political regime of President Kuchma 
at the price of small judiciary reform
The adoption of the Constitution of Ukraine in 1996 gave additional impetus
to the reform of the judiciary. In November 1995 Ukraine obtained member-
ship of the Council of Europe, which was accompanied by Ukraine’s 
assumption of essential duties in the field of judiciary reform, in line with the
Council of Europe standards. On the EU side similar requirements were spec-
ified in the EU–Ukraine Action Plan on Justice and Home Affairs (see Official
Journal 2003). The Council of Europe Convention on Fundamental Rights
and Freedoms, ratified by Ukraine in 1997, articulated the concrete scope of
democratic freedoms and rule of law standards to be implemented by the
Ukrainian government (for example, in a context of ‘a right to a fair trial’).
However, for the time being, these standards remain insufficiently enforced
in Ukraine. Even pro-western change agents in the judiciary are insufficiently
familiar with the scope of fundamental democratic standards and the means
of their interpretation by the ECHR.
200 Roman Petrov and Oleksander Serdyuk
9780415451024-Ch07  4/17/08  5:46 PM  Page 200
In 1990s, the judicial reform in Ukraine was strongly influenced by Russia,
where a parallel reform was enjoying a relative success. For the change agents,
who were the supporters of the reform, the Russian “positive” experience was
an additional argument in favor of the necessity to adapt best European judi-
cial standards, taking into account the post-Soviet realities in Ukraine and in
Russia, dominated by corruption and lengthy court procedures.
Subsequently, in the late 1990s Ukraine witnessed the emergence of an
authoritative political regime associated with the former President Kuchma
(‘Kuchmism’). This situation constituted a main challenge to the judiciary
reform at the time, characterized by the struggle of the executive power for
total control over the judiciary system. Besides, one began to see the forma-
tion of powerful financial and industrial clans (oligarchic structures), which
endeavored to control the judiciary in order to ensure smooth distribution
and redistribution of state property to private hands. In particular, it caused the
preservation of an independent system of economic courts in Ukraine, which
have been influenced by mighty oligarchic clans and presidential power.
In such circumstances the problem of judiciary reform became a key issue
in the conflict between the Verkhovna Rada and the President.14 President
Kuchma vetoed and publicly criticized many draft laws on judicial reform,
which were based on best standards of democratic court procedure and
provided for the enhancement of court independence from the influence of
executive power. Pro-presidential circles within the Verkhovna Rada
prepared alternative draft laws containing mechanisms of direct or indirect
influence of the executive power (already precisely personified by the presidential
vertical of power) on the Ukrainian judiciary system.
At this time, international actors, such as the EU and the Council of
Europe, consistently demanded the proper performance of membership duties
by Ukraine through the adoption of democratic standards. Numerous
programs of assistance to the Ukrainian government and civil society institu-
tions in conducting the judiciary reform were realized jointly with interna-
tional donors. As a result of consistent external support and pressure from the
Council of Europe and the EU, the position of domestic change agents was
strengthened. In this period the composition of change agents was rather
mixed. Apart from a section of the judicial corps (primarily in national
supreme courts), it included the representatives of the political elites (both in
the Parliament and Presidential environment), who supported the pro-western
orientation on the issues of reforming the legal system. However, this 
similarity in the positions of change agents was to a great extent not stable
but pragmatic. The majority of domestic change agents openly joined the
political opposition and various civil society institutions (representatives of 
the ‘third sector’, opposition journalists, and to a lesser degree, scholars and
representatives of the public bureaucracy and judiciary). External assistance
from international organizations (Council of Europe, EU, OSCE) and western 
democratic governments (USA, UK, Canada, Germany, the Netherlands)
through the provision of financial and technical assistance with informational
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and educational programs, expert assistance, internships at the international
organizations brought about successful rule internalization of democratic
values among domestic change agents and enabled their association with the
‘European democratic community’.
Further strengthening of the presidential power in Ukraine gave rise to 
serious concern among international actors. European organizations, such as
the Council of Europe, the EU, and the OSCE, became most active and
openly criticized the Ukrainian political regime. The US position was similar
and was mostly realized by means of “implicit” political recommendations.
On the eve of the presidential elections in 1999, the Parliamentary Assembly
of Council of Europe (PACE) expressed “deep concern” over Ukraine’s slow
implementation of duties it had assumed as a member of the Council of
Europe (Council of Europe 1179/1999a; Council of Europe 1194/1999b;
Council of Europe 1239/2001a; Council of Europe 1244/2001b). European
experts pointed out that since the adoption of the Constitution in 1996, the
Ukrainian authorities “took no measures in the implementation of the judiciary
reform”. As a last measure the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of
Europe warned Ukraine about the possibility of “suspension of membership”
(Council of Europe 1513/2001c).
In response to the external pressure of western governments (USA, UK and
other western European governments) and international organizations
(Council of Europe, EU, OSCE) the Verkhovna Rada adopted in June 2001 a
set of ten laws – with the addition of a significant Law on Judicial
Organization one year later – which were informally entitled “small judiciary
reform”. These laws inserted a few democratic novelties in the judiciary
system in Ukraine: a uniform system of general jurisdiction courts headed by
the Supreme Court of Ukraine; a new procedure of assignment and election
of judges; the Supreme Council of Justice responsible for supervision of
judges; more democratic system of appeal and cessation of judgments; better
judicial control on legality of detention and arrest of persons, and on limita-
tion of correspondence privacy, telephone conversations, cable and other
communications (see Ogorodnik 2004). A direct link between these changes
and the position of Council of Europe, which consistently supported the
necessity of the judicial reform, can be easily seen. However, the main
explanatory factor is still the will of the ruling political elite in Ukraine to
preserve the (constitutional) legitimacy of the recent political regime, because
the five-year term set by Constitution of Ukraine for the changes in the 
judicial system, was almost over.
On the whole, regardless of the motives of the political elites, these actions
marked the beginning of the formation of institutional and administrative
preconditions for a democratic judiciary in Ukraine. In addition, as mentioned
above, the “small judiciary reform” was made because the consistent pressure
from external actors. Thus, ultimately, the adoption of a rather cut-down variant
of this reform with its discrepancies, inconsistencies and disregard of some
important European standards, was a decision, which the ruling elite was forced
to make, not only because of the pressure from the Council of Europe, but to
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avoid formal “unconstitutionality” of the regime before international actors and
the international community.
“In the end, the judiciary system needs to be reformed!”
Although the “small judiciary reform” laid down the main institutional 
foundations of democratic judiciary in Ukraine, it was conducted in a rather
incomplete way, both institutionally and procedurally. One could say that the
general social efficiency of the judiciary system remained low. Moreover, it
could neither function as a high-level democratic institution, nor avoid
conversion into a functional appendix of the ruling political elite.
Disapproval of the existing situation in the Ukrainian judiciary became the
dominant topic of political debate between the ruling elite and political
opposition. It became clear that the adoption of rule of law standards has not
led to the elimination of ‘Soviet judiciary’ standards in Ukraine. The Council
of Europe, the EU, and a few western democratic governments realized that
utmost efforts has to be made to accelerate an effective rule implementation
and rule internalization of western democratic standards inside the Ukrainian
judiciary. International actors had to reassess the means of influence on the
Ukrainian judiciary and to combine technical assistance with direct and indirect
political pressure on members of the judiciary.16
As a result of international actors’ influence, two wings of domestic change
agents were formed. The first is the ‘reformatory’ wing, which consistently
asserted the necessity of reforming the entire judiciary system in line with
European standards of court procedure. Representatives of this wing champi-
oned the adoption of common European legal values, active social interactions
with international actors in the framework of scientific exchange programs,
trainings, conferences, and seminars. They advocated the enforcement of
European legal standards and values through the application by Ukrainian
courts of ECHR case law (according to some estimates, between 2002 and
2004 almost 1,000 judgments were issued taking into account judgments of
the ECHR) (Zhukovska 2004, 18). In the final years of the Kuchma regime,
the Supreme Court of Ukraine enjoyed more independence and freedom. This
could be due to the fact that the Supreme Court maintains close international
connections with the supreme courts of European democratic countries.
The second is the conservative wing, which was not in the majority but was
able to hamper reformatory initiatives within the Ukrainian judiciary. Backed
by the support of the conservative wing the Kuchma regime managed to
subordinate the judiciary to its own interests on the eve of the Orange
Revolution. This took place via the procedures of appointment of judges and
the organization and financing of the judiciary system. However, due to the
influence of international actors, standards of democratic court procedure and
common European legal values have penetrated deep into the minds of
Supreme Court judges, which led to their taking an active position in protect-
ing democratic values during the Revolution. It showed itself in decisions
taken by the Supreme Court of Ukraine during the 2004 presidential election
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campaign, especially in the decision of the third and final round of elections,
when the grounds for it were not only a doctrinal interpretation of the corre-
sponding Ukrainian law on elections, but also the explicit application of
fundamental law of democratic principles.
In the aftermath of the Orange Revolution the new government did not take
immediate actions to accelerate the reform of the judiciary system, which was
explained as “lack of understanding of the problem by the new government”.
Society became discontented by the fact that political practice separated itself
from the rhetoric of the Revolution period. Furthermore, in line with the best
traditions of the old government the pressure upon judges continued, the prac-
tice of selection of judges among “acquaintances” remained unchanged, and
higher public officials made incorrect comments and estimations of certain
court decisions. Eventually, such practice undermined public trust in the new
government. On 5 October 2005, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council
of Europe urged the Ukrainian government “to continue the reform of the judi-
ciary in order to ensure its independence and effectiveness” (Council of Europe
1466/2005). As a result of growing external and internal pressure, President
Yushchenko entrusted the National Commission on strengthening democracy
and the supremacy of law with preparing the Judiciary Reform Concept in
November 2005. This Commission comprised representatives not only of the
Ukrainian government and non-governmental institutions, but also of interna-
tional organizations (the OSCE, the Council of Europe, the European
Commission and others). During the campaign for the parliamentary elections
in March 2006 and also the anticipated elections in September 2007, President
Yushchenko confirmed that the task of initiating the judiciary reform in
Ukraine constitutes one of the top priorities for his party “Nasha Ukraina” and
democratic forces in general. However, there was and there is no single under-
standing of specific directions of the judicial reform among democratic leaders
and parties, which undedermines the perspectives of success.
In conclusion, we can highlight two approaches to judicial reform in
Ukraine during the Kuchma regime. The first approach focused on the need
to continue cooperation with European institutions in the field of judicial
reform on the basis of pro-western democratic standards. The second
approach prioritized the need to strengthen “administrative and controlling
mechanisms in the judiciary” in order to gain control over the judiciary
system from the executive. The 2001 Judiciary Reform Concept represented
a compromise between these two approaches. On the one hand, there was the
formal rule adoption of western democratic standards. On the other hand, veto
players within the government managed to maintain “controlled courts” at
their disposal. Thus, it became more advantageous to preserve the current situ-
ation than to accelerate rule implementation and rule internalization of rule of
law standards by the judiciary in Ukraine. However, the changed political
situation after the Orange Revolution led to the revision of the format of the
judicial reform in Ukraine. In March 2006 the new Concept on Judiciary
Reform was drafted. This ‘Concept’ targets the establishment of fair trial in
Ukraine in accordance with best European standards. On the whole, the
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content of the new Concept corresponds to established values of 
the democratic court procedure, though the possibility of effective rule imple-
mentation and rule internalization of this Concept is under question. Within
a few days of the issuing of the Concept, the Council of Judges of Ukraine
requested President Yushchenko to suspend this process, because the conse-
quence of its introduction could be the “destruction of the entire judiciary
system”. The issue was the conflict over specific institutional and administra-
tive models of implementation of the Concept. In our opinion, ways to resolve
this conflict will be defined not only by the relations between internal insti-
tutions and political forces, but also by the reaction of the Council of Europe
and the EU. In early 2006, several programs of technical assistance to Ukraine,
which were financed mainly by the European Commission and USAID, were
initiated to reform the judiciary system,. These programs had two goals: (1) to
create material pre-conditions for the reform (technical equipment of the
courts, renovation of the premises, etc.), and; (2) to form public support for
values of the reform. This had to provide not only formal democratic rule
adoption, but also its real implementation in Ukrainian society. However, the
contemporary political situation in the country became an obstacle to these
reforms. Parliamentary elections in 2006 brought to power veto players led by
the Party of Regions, As a result, progressive draft laws on judicial reform
prepared by the President’s secretariat are not likely to be adopted by the
Verkhovna Rada, due to the lack of ideological and legal incentives, and the
desire for counteraction by the Presidential power and political forces, united
around the Prime Minister. Delay in realizing judicial reform in Ukraine
resulted in the inability of the judiciary to resolve the constitutional crisis in
April 2007. The Ukrainian judiciary was frequently used by either side of the
Ukrainian political elite in the course of their political struggle. The
Constitutional Court of Ukraine was pressed by all political powers to produce
a decision on the constitutionality of the Edict of the President of Ukraine to
disband the Verkhovna Rada in their favor (Edict of the President of Ukraine
264/2007a). Furthermore, in the course of exercising this pressure President
Yuschenko dismissed two judges of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine with-
out legal reason. In response to this situation the Parliamentary Assembly of
the Council of Europe
deplore[d] the fact that the judicial system of Ukraine has been systemati-
cally misused by other branches of power and that top officials do not
execute the courts’ decisions, which is a sign of erosion of this crucial
democratic institution. Independent and impartial judiciary is a precon-
dition for the existence of a democratic society governed by the rule of
law. Therefore, there is an urgent necessity for the Ukrainian political
elite to carry out a comprehensive judicial reform, including through
amendments to the Constitution.17
To conclude these two sections, reforms in the area of civil freedoms and
political rights, as well as improvement of the judicial independence, give us
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grounds to argue that Ukraine has achieved a successful transition from
authoritarian regime to hybrid regime. Suppression of freedom of expression
and democracy underpinned by the declarative character of democratic and
rule of law reforms during the period of Kuchmism entailed the emergence
of the authoritarian regime in the pre-Orange Revolution era between 1991
and 2005. The decline of democratic standards in Ukraine was illustrated by
the rigging of the first round of presidential elections in November 2004 and
by the murders of opposition journalists. Popular disappointment combined
with increasing pressure on the part of international actors and change agents
caused a nationwide uprising, which led to the non-violent Orange Revolution
and the triumph of Viktor Yuschenko in January 2005. Democratic reforms
in the post-Revolution period resulted in the adoption of fundamental 
western democratic and rule of law standards by Ukrainian society. The inde-
pendence of the mass media was strengthened, and the Ukrainian judiciary
underwent reforms aimed at its independence, transparency and impartiality.
In general, after the Revolution Ukraine was transformed into a more plural-
istic and democratic society. The constitutional reform, which resulted from
the Revolution, moved Ukraine from a presidential republic closer to a
parliamentary republic. The political opposition obtained more confidence in
expressing its own views and protecting its own rights. However, democratic
reforms have not been completed to the point to consider Ukraine as a
democracy. The Ukrainian political elite has not been able to ensure the full
independence of the judiciary. The judiciary in Ukraine has been used to
protect and promote political interests and objectives of both change agents
and veto players. As a result, the judiciary in Ukraine has not been able to
play a significant role in resolving the constitutional and political crises 
in 2007. In the end, the perspectives of reforming the Ukrainian judicial 
system remain undetermined because there is no unity in the understanding
of objectives and actions within the change agents themselves.
Reforms aimed at increasing institutional 
and administrative capacity
Insufficient attention on the part of international actors (the EU) to the 
institutional and administrative capacity reforms led to a delay in democratic
transition in Ukraine. In particular, this concerns the increase in the 
institutional and administrative capacity of legislative and executive powers.
Before the Orange Revolution the legislative and executive became closely
interrelated branches of power that served the interests of strong oligarch
lobby groups. The legislative power gained a notorious reputation of being a
nontransparent and closed institution where MPs serve their business interests.
The executive became known for its corruption and nepotism. Turbulent
changes in the civil service in the aftermath of the Revolution led to an
immediate flow of qualified professionals from their positions. These people
have been replaced by new individuals who claimed loyalty to the new
‘Orange’ government but who, in many cases, lacked impartiality and sufficient
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experience in public administration. As a result, the government faced a difficult
dilemma – either to bring back the professionals to the civil service, disre-
garding their party preferences, or to improve the training of existing civil
servants in line with best European standards. So far the government has tried
to pursue both paths. The newly launched constitutional reform has been
designed to accelerate these processes through: (1) improving the drafting,
discussing and passing laws; and (2) administrative and public service reform.
Improving drafting, discussing and passing laws in Ukraine
The process of preparing and adopting draft laws in Ukraine resembles the
legislative pipeline procedures in other European countries. However, there
are drawbacks which seriously reduce the transparency of the entire legisla-
tive process. Veto players, that is, representatives of the bureaucratic elite and
strong financial and industrial groups, created these drawbacks in order to
keep the legislative process in Ukraine as non-transparent and non-objective
as possible, in order to lobby for their political and business interests. The
new political configuration of the Verkhovna Rada does not provide for final
solution to these problems, because the interest of the dominant parliamentary
forces in the “manual regulation” of the legislative process is growing.
Every draft law has to be scrutinized by the parliamentary committees of
the Verkhovna Rada. However, decisions adopted by parliamentary commit-
tees on the legality of draft laws have the status of recommendations. This
means that they are not binding for MPs, who can easily disregard recom-
mendations proposed and act by means of consensus. This situation signifi-
cantly strengthens the role of veto players, who can easily ignore the decisions
of parliamentary committees in favor of own political interests. Especially,
this situation inhibits the effective implementation of international democratic
standards, such as the EU and Council of Europe acquis.
The possibility of public discussion of draft laws to be adopted by the
Verkhovna Rada illustrates the bureaucratic inertia and strong influence of
veto players (bureaucrats, politicians who lobby for the interests of powerful
oligarch groups). Public discussion of draft laws is envisaged by Article 9 of
the Law of Ukraine ‘On Basis of the State Regulatory Policy in the Sphere of
Business Activity’ (1160/2003). This law allows everyone to present
comments on a bill proposed for public discussion. Moreover the rules of
Article 9 oblige the parties to take into account proposed comments while
preparing a final draft law. However, only a limited number of bills can fall
within these categories, which are “regulatory acts in the sphere of business
activity”. Thus, bills of other acts, which do not belong to the category of
regulatory ones, are not being opened for wide public discussion.
On 3 January 2006 the constitutional amendments adopted in December
2004 came into force and significantly changed the political system in
Ukraine. These changes gave more power to the Verkhovna Rada with regard
to the appointment of the executive, and control over its activity. Besides, it
is believed that the make-up of the parliamentary majority will render the
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process of preparation and law adoption more controlled and predictable.
However, this can be accompanied by the limitation of the opposition’s
opportunity to influence the situation in the drafting of laws.
Administrative and public service reforms
The administrative reform that commenced in 1998 envisaged the application
of measures aimed at increasing the effectiveness of state executive authorities
in Ukraine. It was initiated by the Edict of the President of Ukraine ‘On
Measures for Implementing the Concept of the Administrative Reform in
Ukraine’ (Edict of the President of Ukraine 817/1998). The concept itself was
developed by the State Commission on Administrative Reform in Ukraine –
a special advisory body that functioned under the President of Ukraine’s
office. This body closely cooperated with international actors, that is, more
precisely the Council of Europe, the EU, and the OCSE, in order to conduct
the administrative reform in line with best international and European 
practices. The reform pursued the following objectives: effective organization of
executive power at central and local levels of administration; formation of a
modern system of local self-government in line with European standards; protec-
tion of human rights and freedoms by the executive and local government;
creation of a modern system of training and retraining of public employees; and
the establishing of the efficient administrative system in Ukraine.
Since the Orange Revolution the objectives of the administrative reform
have been revised and complemented with new objectives, such as trans-
parency of public authorities, decentralization of governance, reform of law
enforcement bodies, minimization of controlling functions of public bodies
and increase of local self-government resources through territorial and budg-
etary reforms (Edict of the President of Ukraine 39/2006). The administra-
tive reform was formally launched on 1 January 2007. The Council of Europe,
the EU, representatives of western democratic governments and domestic
change agents, such as pro-western political parties and pro-western political
elites, hope that the administrative reform will enable decentralization of
state regional administrations and, consequently, increase regional adminis-
trations’ revenues through liberalization of tax legislation and adoption of the
new Budget Code of Ukraine.
The first law on public service in Ukraine was adopted in 1993. This estab-
lished the general framework for the organization and functioning of public
service in Ukraine. However, this law, which has been amended several times,
hardly allows the formation of a system of public service in line with
European standards. European experts emphasized the following substantive
drawbacks: vagueness of the scope of the legislation on public service, serv-
ice; lack of clear regulation of administrative procedures; lack of clear and
transparent rules for state employees’ salaries (the main problem in this case
being that the existing legislation considers a state employee’s rate of salary as
an insignificant part of their salary whereas at the same time all other parts
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of state employees’ incomes are at the discretion of their manager and the
award depends on subjective factors). Consequently, there is a lack of standards
to assess the results of bureaucratic activity. Acknowledging the weaknesses
of the law on public service, change agents initiated rule adoption and
approximation of Ukrainian legislation on public service to European and
international standards. Over several years, with the assistance of European
consultative and expert programs, the government developed a new draft law
on public service that was to be completed in detailed form and adjusted to
European standards by the ‘Code of Ethical Standards of Behaviour of Persons
Authorized to Implement State Functions’. For this purpose, issues of the
improvement of the quality of public service and enhancement of the procedure
for appeals by individuals against public employees’ actions were put at the
top of the administrative reform agenda.
Constitutional crisis (April 2007): a new call for institutional 
and administrative reform
On 2 April 2007 the almost year-long confrontation between the minority
‘Orange’ coalition (‘Nasha Ukraine’, ‘BUT’) and the so called “anti-crisis”
majority coalition (‘Party of Regions’, Socialist Party, Communist Party)
culminated in an open constitutional crisis, when President Yuschenko issued
an Edict to disband the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine and to call new parlia-
mentary elections in May 2007 (Edict of the President of Ukraine 264/2007a).
The major motivation for this radical step on the part of the President of
Ukraine was to terminate the “unconstitutional” transfer of MPs – members
of the “Orange” coalition – to the “anti-crisis” coalition. However, the consti-
tutional crisis provoked further instability in Ukraine and the division of
Ukrainian people into the west and the east. The Verkhovna Rada did not
recognize the legality of the Edict of the President and asked the
Constitutional Court of Ukraine to consider whether the Edict complied with
the Constitution of Ukraine.
In an atmosphere of escalating nationwide political crisis the
Constitutional Court of Ukraine was expected to deliver a decision which had
to be recognized by both parties to the conflict. For the second time since the
Revolution, all members of the political elite in Ukraine expressed their
readiness to accept the decision of the judiciary and not to continue the
confrontation. However, due to the decision, expected by many experts, of the
Constitutional Court in favor of the Verkhovna Rada, President Yuschenko
exercised serious pressure on the judges of the Constitutional Court by
dismissing two of them without legally justified reasoning. Further,
President Yuschenko repealed the “expected to be unconstitutional” Edict
from 2 April 2007, issued a new Edict on 26 April 2007 and called for a new
postponement of the date of the parliamentary elections (Edict of the
President of Ukraine 335/2007b). This decision ended all hopes of settling
the conflict by legal means and risked further escalation of the political battle.
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Finally, after exhausting all legal and institutional means to settle the conflict
and following active political mediation by the EU High Representative for the
Common Foreign and Security Policy, Javier Solana, leaders of the opposing
camps (President Yuschenko and Prime Minister Yanukovich) reached a
shaky compromise at a private meeting on 4 May 2007 and agreed to hold
new parliamentary elections in July 2007.
Several weeks later, after intensive consultations with representatives of all
political parties, President Yuschenko set a new date for the parliamentary 
elections of September 30th 2007. The constitutional crisis in April 2007
displayed several failures of the Ukrainian political elite. First, there was the
inability of both change agents and veto players to solve continuing political
confrontation by legal and institutional means. Second, there was the need to
develop democratically functioning and respected institutional and adminis-
trative capacity of the legislative and executive in Ukraine in order to avoid
further confrontations. Keen competition between the political forces, their
irresponsibility and the fight for posts and authorities were the direct causes
of the crisis. However, this explanation is not complete, since it had deep
institutional roots as well. According to Council of Europe Parliamentary
Assembly Resolution 1549, they were caused as a result of the incomplete
constitutional reform of 2004, which came into effect at the beginning of
2006. From the very beginning European institutions paid attention to the
fact that its provisions did not correspond to European democratic standards
(such assessments were presented in detail in the conclusion of the Venetian
Commission in 2004). A full proportional electoral system does not guarantee
the representation of the interests of the whole people of Ukraine and may lead
to a distortion of people’s will. On the level of branches of powers the lack of
an effective system of restraints and counterbalances gives grounds to political
forces to feel their supremacy, in terms of the law as well. Even the principles
of Constitutional Court formation are such as to make it dependent on politi-
cal forces and individuals. The constitutional reform of 2004 took place as an
internal process only. No external factors had influence over it and its logic
was defined by the interests of the political elite only, which regarded it as a
means of achieving their specific aims in the power struggle.
Finally, we would argue that enhancement of the institutional and admin-
istrative capacity (improving its transparency, observation of democratic and
human rights standards) of the legislative and executive in Ukraine was not
on the priority list of international actors, that is, of the Council of Europe,
the EU, the OCSE, and western democratic governments. As a result, domes-
tic change agents did not manage to create modern and efficiently function-
ing institutional and administrative capacity in Ukraine, which caused the
sharp constitution confrontation in April 2007. Declared reforms have been
limited by rule adoption, but omitted effective rule implementation and rule
internalization. One can argue that for a long time after gaining independ-
ence Ukraine remained a hybrid regime with elements of autocratic and
democratic government. However, the democratic reforms in the aftermath of
the Revolution significantly raised democratic standards in Ukrainian society
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and pushed forward democracy in the whole governmental machinery. Thus,
contemporary Ukraine approached the level of a country with solid minimal
democracy. International actors, such as the Council of Europe, EU, and
OCSE, acknowledged the results of democratic parliamentary elections in
Ukraine in March 2006 and praised Ukraine’s results in ensuring freedom of
speech and media. However, serious work should be done to enhance demo-
cratic standards not only in Kiev and other big regional centers, but also in
smaller regions so as to promote standards of democracy and good governance
in Ukraine as a whole.
Reforms to combat corruption, illegality and abuse of power
The existence of corruption in Soviet society was publicly admitted during
Gorbachyov’s perestroika at the end of the 1980s. It was acknowledged that
corruption is not an exception or atypical phenomenon in the conduct of 
officials, but a more systematic phenomenon, caused by serious problems in
society. Therefore, after achieving independence Ukraine embarked upon
overcoming the institutional causes of corruption. Romantic illusions about
the possibility of eliminating this phenomenon by means of a “democratic
choice” vanished rather quickly. Since the early 1990s, the Ukrainian 
government and political elites, that is, the leading political parties and
representatives of business, endeavored to search for a pattern for an efficient
anticorruption policy, optimum legislative tools and law-enforcement 
mechanisms. The first mention of corruption in Ukrainian legislation
appeared on 16 December 1993 in the Law of Ukraine ‘On Public Service’
(Law of Ukraine 3723/1993). This law stated that a public official cannot
“commit actions, which can be considered as a way of exploiting an official
position in mercenary motives in his/her own interests, and also actions,
which according to the current legislation are considered as corruption” (Law
ofUkraine 3723/1993, part. 2, para. 5). Nevertheless, the provisions of this
law became rather declarative since Ukrainian legislation neither defined the
concept ‘corruption’, nor the actions that should be referred to as corruption 
or abuse of power. It happened because at that time neither members of 
the executive nor members of the legislature were aware about best western
practices to combat corruption, illegality and abuse of power.
In this situation the best European experiences and corresponding political
legal standards did not help domestic change agents very much, for two
reasons. The first is that the formation of the Ukrainian pattern to fight
corruption and abuse of power coincided with the process of formation of the
relevant European standards. Only in 1999 did the Council of Europe draft
and adopt two fundamental anti-corruption conventions (Criminal and
Civil).18 The second reason is the absence of sustainable political will in
Ukraine to apply best European and international standards to combat
corruption and abuse of power. In the end, the Ukrainian government
pursued imitation of anti-corruption activities in order to maintain positive
cooperation with international institutions.
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Anti-corruption legislation: hopes and disappointments
Ukrainian anti-corruption legislation displays the complexity and discrepancy
of the political and legal reforms in the 1990s. At this time corruption grad-
ually became an inherent part of life in Ukraine. Neither the state nor civil
society could find solutions and potential to tackle this problem. For the state
it was the “fight against its own shadow”, and civil society was in the process
of post-totalitarian social transformations and was rather weak at that time.
The starting point for the development of the anticorruption legislation in
Ukraine was the adoption of Laws of Ukraine ‘On Fight Against Corruption’
(Law of Ukraine 356/1995a) and “On Amendments and Additions to Some
Legislative Acts of Ukraine in View of Adoption of Law of Ukraine “On Fight
Against Corruption” in 1995 (Law of Ukraine 358/1995b). These laws are in
line with general tendencies in the European post-socialist countries, where
similar laws were also adopted in the same period. The Council of Europe agen-
cies took an active part in drafting Ukrainian laws against corruption, granting
consulting assistance, and examining the relevant projects. The Russian experi-
ence, where the initial conditions for the anti-corruption reform were almost
identical to Ukraine, had the most evident influence on the drafting of
Ukrainian anti-corruption legislation.
Ukrainian laws to combat corruption are rather repressive because they
provide a uniform method of fighting corruption – bringing administrative
(disciplinary) action against persons committing corruption offences. The
prevention of corruption is limited to establishment of interdictions (limita-
tions) concerning the actions of public officials and other persons authorized
to fulfill functions of the state. The adoption of anticorruption laws became
the subject of prolonged political disputes within the Ukrainian political elite
at that time. In the end veto players managed to lobby for legal drafts of a
rather repressive nature, rather than drafts of a precautionary nature. Such an
approach was the reflection of an inclination to follow a repressive way of solv-
ing these problems, in line with the traditions of the Soviet criminal justice.
It was this approach that was supported by the members of law-enforcement
bodies imposing it on the political elites in the Verkhovna Rada. The absence
of a clearly formulated alternative (in this period, in particular, 
the formation of general European anti-corruption standards was only just 
beginning), and also the interest of the presidential power to take some steps
that would not pose a threat to the existing relationship, but would constitute
some response to the needs of society, created the basis for the choice of the
simplified repressive model.
As a result, the fight against corruption in Ukraine moved towards formalism.
The government issued new laws and measures to combat corruption, but in
practice the level of corruption did not change (Buromenskiy and Serdyk 2004a,
4–15). In other words, it became limited to reporting to law-enforcement
agencies and bringing charges against representatives of the lowest rank of
the state apparatus, such as secretaries of rural councils, for committing
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minor corruption offences. Very soon the imperfection of the anticorruption
laws became obvious to many people, both in law-enforcement bodies and in
Ukrainian society. Change agents initiated the drafting of almost 20 new
anti-corruption laws in close cooperation with the Council of Europe and
other international agencies. These draft laws did not fundamentally 
change the general approach to corruption control and related only to specific
problems, which were, nevertheless, quite important. For example, there were
proposals to extend the range of subject liability for corruption activity, to
implement a mechanism of financial accountability of civil servants (avowal
of receipts and expenditures). In this period the position of change agents was
neither clearly formed, nor were they strictly identified. The initiators of the
draft laws were members of the Verkhovna Rada and their content was frag-
mentary. It should be noted that in some cases even proposals to weaken anti-
corruption measures were adopted. However, these drafts were given a
lukewarm reception by the veto players, who claimed that the new anticor-
ruption laws looked exotic and did not correspond to Ukrainian realities. 
For example, experts in the field of criminal law rather actively denied any
possibility of establishing criminal responsibility of legal persons for corrupt
actions in Ukraine.
The issuing of the Council of Europe Criminal and Civil Conventions on
corruption in 1999 accelerated the necessity to align Ukrainian anti-corrup-
tion legislation with best European practice. However, the veto players (polit-
ical and business elites supporting the regime of President Kuchma) preferred
immediate cosmetic changes rather than radical reconsideration of Ukrainian
legislation. They could never accept the general approach to these Conventions,
because it threatened the existence of the whole system of corruption rela-
tions, which were already formed on the basis of political institutions in
Ukraine. That is why the political elites, united around the presidential
power, became major veto players.
The Orange Revolution inspired further acceleration of anti-corruption 
law-drafting initiatives in Ukraine. Representatives of European organizations
initiated political consultations with the new government on the improve-
ment of Ukrainian anti-corruption legislation. Western donors launched new
large-scale projects with this in mind in 2006. However, the new political
elites, which supported President Yuschenko, did not support these initia-
tives, thereby acknowledging the conflict between further anti-corruption
reforms and their political and business interests. Actually their position
coincided with the attitude of veto players towards the tasks of reforming the
anti-corruption legislation in Ukraine. Indeed, one of the first slogans of the
Revolution, the separation of business from government, could hardly be imple-
mented, since key figures in the movement endeavored to improve their busi-
ness through the new government. Notorious corruption scandals in autumn
2005, arising from the process of re-privatization and redistribution of state
property, hampered anti-corruption activities and led to complicated results
of parliamentary elections in March 2006 and the sudden ruin of the ‘Orange’
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coalition in July 2006. The beginning of this crisis is attributed to public
charges preferred by one of the coalition leaders, Alexander Zinchenko,
against politicians from President Yushchenko’s inner circle (O. Tretyakov, 
P. Poroshenko and others) when he pointed out their use of state positions to
strengthen their private business, contrary to the public interest, using admin-
istrative pressure, corrupt lobbying and also favoritism.
These circumstances, the inefficient working of the Verkhovna Rada and
the absence of the Constitutional Court raised serious doubts over the feasi-
bility of adopting a new generation of anticorruption laws that could serve as
a basis for the new strategy of fighting against corruption in 2006. However,
the situation changed radically when the agreement between the President
and political forces united around the Party of Regions was attained in
August 2006. The Universal of National Unity was signed by representatives
of all the ruling political parties in Ukraine (with the exception of the
Communist Party) and provided support for the presidential package of 
anti-corruption laws. This package, attached to the Universal of National
Unity, included the following legislative acts: ratification by the Verkhovna
Rada of UN Anti-corruption Conventions, as well as Council of Europe Civil
and Criminal Law Conventions on corruption; adoption of draft laws that
aligned Ukrainian anti-corruption legislation with best international 
standards, i.e. a new framework law ‘On Corruption Prevention Principles’,
the law on ‘Amendments and Additions for Criminal Legislation and Legislation
on Administrative Responsibility’ and a landmark draft law for Ukraine on
liability of legal persons for corrupt actions.
This package was submitted to the Verkhovna Rada in September 2006.
However, it was not formalized due to the failure to form a united parliamen-
tary coalition between pro-Russian political parties (the Party of Regions, the
Socialist Party, and the Communist Party) and presidential forces (Party
‘Nasha Ukraina’ and ‘BUT’). As a result, the parliamentary majority, which
was formed on the basis of the Party of Regions, started to hamper the 
adoption of anticorruption laws. During the entire period when they were in
power, veto players did not make any attempts in reforming the Ukrainian
anti-corruption legislation.
GRECO membership as major factor in enhancing 
effectiveness of anti-corruption activities
In January 2006 the Ukrainian government and the Verkhovna Rada took
major steps to reinvigorate the anti-corruption program through democratic
anchoring. In particular, Ukraine ratified the Council of Europe Civil Law
Convention on Corruption (ETS 173) and joined the Group of Countries
Against Corruption (GRECO) in 2006. This meant that Ukraine fell under
the GRECO control mechanism, which allows better implementation of
European anti-corruption standards. However, the decision to join GRECO
did not meet with universal approval in Ukraine. There were continuous
discussions between members of the political elite concerning probable 
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consequences for Ukraine, because real implementation of GRECO standards
demanded radical changes to the entire Ukrainian legal system.
At the end of 2006 Ukraine was scheduled to go through the procedure of
the monitoring of the progress of the national anti-corruption program.
Obviously, for this purpose the Ukrainian government is endeavoring to
accelerate the implementation of the anti-corruption program. Such steps
were envisaged in the framework of the political agreement between
President Yuschenko and the ruling political elite. Besides the above-
mentioned package of anti-corruption drafts, President Yuschenko approved
by decree the National Program of Fight against Corruption ‘On the Way to
Integrity’ in September 2006. However, practical implementation of this
decree was blocked by the Party of Regions as a response to the failure of the
negotiations to create the united parliamentary majority. This led to the
dismissal of the anti-corruption laws package by the Verkhovna Rada. This
situation demonstrates the weakness of the internal preconditions for the real
implementation of European anticorruption legal standards in Ukraine (lack
of clear position of change agents, public awareness, perception of value bases,
etc.). At the end of October 2007 the official position of GRECO was
published: it affirmed that Ukraine was behind in the actual implementation
of the European anti-corruption standards. The reason of this was the contin-
uing divergence within the Ukrainian political elite in understanding how to
combat corruption in Ukraine and what kind of European experience is better
to adopt and implement.
Police reform and civilian control of the security forces
The senior officers in the Ukrainian police and security services were raised and
trained in the USSR. Therefore, the newly born Ukrainian police and security
forces have inherited problems that were common in the vanished Soviet police
system: low effectiveness; centralization and militarization; absence of civil
control over law-enforcement; and non-correspondence of Ukrainian criminal
legislation to international and European standards. However, the Ukrainian
government decided to pursue gradual police reform, in line with best
European standards and practice, in order to meet the criteria of membership
of the Council of Europe. The EU and the Council of Europe encouraged a
certain degree of policy reassessment and democratic anchoring within the
activities of the police and enhancement of civil control over police and secu-
rity. Hitherto, problems in rule internalization and embedding of democratic
rule of law remain at the top of the police reform and civil control agenda.
However, the progress achieved in these areas continues to be quite modest.
This is because police reform and civil control never became top priorities in
the EU–Ukraine relations and have been given secondary attention from inter-
national actors, including the EU and the Council of Europe.
Issues of the reform of justice, police and good governance are not covered
by the EU–Ukraine PCA – the basic legal document in force, which regulates
bilateral EU–Ukraine relations. Instead, attention to these issues has been
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limited to a few non-binding EU documents, such as the EU–Ukraine 
relations agenda in the EU–Ukraine Justice and Internal Affairs Action 
Plan 2001, the European Council Common Strategy on Ukraine 1999, and
the EU–Ukraine Action Plan 2005. However, none of these documents
provides serious impetus and comprehensive framework for substantial
reform of the Ukrainian police and the enhancement of civil control over
police and security. The 1999 European Council Common Strategy on
Ukraine states that the EU supports Ukraine in all its efforts aimed at “prop-
erly functioning independent judiciary, a professional police force, the devel-
opment of a meritocratic, well-trained public administration at national,
regional and local levels are all key elements in the effective implementation
of government decisions” (Article 10 of the European Council Common
Strategy on Ukraine 331/1999). The EU–Ukraine Action Plan envisages
training of the police in the prevention of ill-treatment and torture.19 The
EU–Ukraine Justice and Internal Affairs Action Plan 2001 foresees
exchanges of information and police cooperation between the Ukrainian
police and police forces of the EU member states, as well as prevention of
crimes, and training of Ukrainian police officers to the level of the EU.
However, these documents scarcely tackle issues of low effectiveness, central-
ization and militarization, absence of civil control over law-enforcement, and
non-correspondence of Ukrainian criminal legislation with international and
European standards.
Problems of effectiveness and civil control
The number of police and security organs has grown immensely since
Ukrainian independence in 1991 but they have not proved to be more effec-
tive. Since 1991 their number has increased seventeen-fold. As a result, the
contemporary Ukrainian police and security force is bigger than the
Ukrainian army. This means that there is one policeman per 120 citizens of
Ukraine. At the same time, this increase in numbers has not brought with it
an increase in Ukrainian police effectiveness in fighting constantly growing
crime, especially organized crime.
The issue of civil control over police forces in Ukraine remained unresolved. 
In accordance with Ukrainian legislation none of the law-enforcement agencies
can avoid civil control. Provisions of the Law of Ukraine ‘On Democratic Civil
Control over Military Units and State Law-Enforcement Organs’ set a mecha-
nism, which extends civil control to absolutely all the law-enforcement agen-
cies (Law of Ukraine 975/2003a). Nevertheless, although the control system
envisaged by Ukrainian law is comprehensive, the issue of the civil control
effectiveness has hardly been improved. High profile criminal cases (the murder
of opposition journalists Gongadze and Alexandrov) remain unsolved. The
investigation process is insufficiently transparent to give the public appropriate
information about the case.
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Training of police officers and other law-enforcement agencies
One of the reasons for the low effectiveness of democratic reforms in the
Ukrainian police and security organs is the inadequate system of training of
future police and security officers. Firstly, the system is based on Soviet military
traditions, which did not teach to best European democratic practices. Secondly,
the training of future and present police officers is carried out by military police
academies and does not promote independent training (reform of curricula in
line with European standards and participation of students in exchange
programs abroad).
Specific educational establishments organized within the relevant law-
enforcement agencies have a certain degree of initiative and independence.
However, EU financial and technical assistance provide very little help for
curriculum development in police and security educational establishments in
Ukraine. As a result, there has been very little impact on the police academies
in implementing new curricula on democratic rule of law. This system of
education does not create change agents, such as pro-western senior officers
and decision-makers among future police and security officers.
Conclusions
Table 7.1 displays the various factors that inhibit the process of rule adoption,
rule implementation, and rule internalization of democratic rule of law stan-
dards in Ukraine. To conclude, we have set out a number of specific charac-
teristics that lead us to believe that Ukraine enjoys a specific path in adopting
western democratic rule of law standards. These distinguish Ukraine from
other countries – the subjects of case studies in this book. The first character-
istic is the geographical split of the country caused by numerous historical,
ethnic and cultural disparities between the west and the east of Ukraine. This
has far-reaching political consequences on the attempts by change agents to
promote democratic rule of law reforms in Ukraine. It is because the west of
Ukraine traditionally supports political parties with a clear pro-European orien-
tation, while the east backs political circles which advocate reinvigoration of
regional, political and economic integration in the post-USSR area under the
leadership of the Russian Federation. That is why pro-western political parties
usually play the role of change agents and pro-eastern political elite usually 
act as veto players in the process of rule adoption and rule implementation of
western democratic rule of law standards in Ukraine.
The second characteristic is the vagueness of the EU external policy
towards Ukraine. The EU pretends to play a leading role among international
actors in exporting democratic rule of law values to third countries. Ukraine
is no exception. Throughout the last decade the EU has skilfully applied the
policy of conditionality in order to accelerate democratic reforms in Ukraine.
However, while “welcoming European aspirations” the EU never promised
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Ukraine the prospect of EU membership, justifying this policy by the need
to absorb ten new members and to solve a turbulent internal constitutional
crisis. Such an approach led to the weakening of domestic change agents vis-
à-vis strong veto players. It could be argued that the European
Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), devised as a substitute for full membership of
the EU, brought modest results to both the EU and Ukraine. On the one
hand, the ENP did not undermine the influence of the Russian Federation
over Ukraine. On the other hand, ENP conditionality, without the prospect
of full membership of the EU, did not justify the deterioration of Ukraine’s
relations with the Russian Federation, which led to painful conflicts over gas,
meat and sugar between the two countries.
The third characteristic is the strong political and economic influence of
Russia on the Ukrainian political elites. The densely populated Russian-
speaking eastern regions of Ukraine enjoy historically close cultural and
economic links with the Russian Federation. Most of the Ukrainian steel and
machinery industry is experiencing considerable difficulties in accessing the
highly competitive and protective European and US markets. Instead, they
find valuable alternatives in the east. Pro-EU and pro-NATO aspirations in
Ukraine might question the strength of Russian political and economic lever-
ages in Ukraine. That is why the Russian Federation is keen to maintain its
influence through powerful veto players (the anti-crisis political coalition and
representatives of business) in Ukraine. The EU’s adherence to the policy of
conditionality without adequate economic ‘carrots’, on the one hand, and the
relative openness of the Russian internal market to Ukrainian products,
combined with soaring dependency on Russian energy sources, on the other
hand, ensure the continuation of significant Russian political and economic
influence in Ukraine in the near future.
Finally, we consider how the entire model of EUCLIDA has worked for
Ukraine. In general, rule adoption proved to be very difficult for Ukraine.
Strong veto players used their utmost influence to prevent rule adoption 
of democratic rule of law standards in order to maintain control over the 
judiciary and police force. Unfortunately, veto players managed to preserve
their control over the judiciary and police in the time of Kuchmism and 
in the post-Orange Revolution period. In addition, rule adoption of 
democratic rule of law standards process was hampered by the contradictory
and diverse influence of international actors. In particular, in the mid-1990s
European and US international actors promoted their different standards in
the area of the judiciary almost simultaneously, thereby causing problems 
in rule implementation and rule internalization of rule of law for Ukrainian
change agents. A slow and difficult rule adoption took place in the fields 
of the reform of institutional and administrative capacity, combating 
corruption and police reform. The problems of adopting appropriate rules 
in combating corruption can be explained by the fact that the reform of
Ukrainian anti-corruption legislation coincided with formation of European
anti-corruption standards. Membership of the Council of Europe, combined
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with consistent EU conditionality towards Ukraine, led to successful rule
adoption in the area of civil freedoms and human rights. After heated political
debates, the death penalty was abolished and freedom of expression was
enhanced.
The processes of rule implementation and rule internalization of demo-
cratic rule of law standards were not achieved at the desired level. In most
cases, veto players (bureaucrats, extremist political parties, and the political
elite supported by strong industrial and financial capital) torpedoed any
progress of rule adoption. Moreover, poor rule implementation and rule inter-
nalization were caused by objective factors, such as the inadequate knowledge
of members of Ukrainian judiciary about practice of the ECHR and the EU
acquis. Unfortunately, international actors have not been effective in filling in
educational gaps in the preparation of change agents within the Ukrainian
judiciary and police force. There were also serious setbacks in institutional
and administrative capacity. Change agents were hardly in a position to
promote democratic rule of law standards, since key agencies set up as flag-
ships of democratic rule of law reforms had no competence to issue binding
decisions.
For the last decade the EU has advocated intensive anchoring of western
democratic values in Ukraine. However, rule adoption of these values has not
brought efficient rule implementation and internalization. One of the reasons
is the fact that, hitherto, European integration has not become a widely
accepted objective of political and economic reforms in Ukrainian society. For
the time being Ukrainian political elites are unlikely to pursue further
rapprochement with the EU at the expense of deteriorating relations with
Russia. The Russian government has skillfully used Ukraine’s dependence on
energy supplies from Russia. As a result of the new Russian energy policy
towards Ukraine, ordinary Ukrainians have experienced a sharp increase in
their energy bills. On the other hand, the Ukrainian public realizes that other
alternatives, such as closer integration with Russian and other CIS member
states, could bring cheaper energy supplies and better access to less compet-
itive eastern markets. Yet, by 2006 the ENP objectives had not become
widely accepted as an appropriate alternative to CIS integration. As a result,
there is no national consensus on the future of the pro-European policy in
Ukraine.20 Nonetheless, the process of democratic rule of law implementa-
tion has achieved considerable progress in Ukraine, due to constant pressure
from change agents and international actors. Fundamental democratic
values have become a mandatory part of the programme of all the political
parties in Ukraine. Change agents (‘BUT’ and the ‘Our Ukraine Party’) and
veto players (the anti-crisis coalition headed by the Party of Regions)
unequivocally endorse the pro-European foreign policy of Ukraine and need
to continue implementation of common European democratic values. This
leads us to conclude that the process of democratic rule of law implemen-
tation in Ukraine has indeed been developing along the lines suggested in
the EUCLIDA model.
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Notes
1 Relevant information about the results of parliamentary elections in Ukraine could be
found at the web site of the Central Electoral Commission of Ukraine <http://www.cvk.
gov.ua> (last access: 22 October 2007).
2 For instance, immediately after signing the EU-Ukraine Action Plan the leader of the
Communist Party of Ukraine, Symonenko, accused the EU of seeing Ukraine as an
unequal partner. Instead, he urged Ukraine to accelerate economic integration with former
USSR republics. See www.liga.kiev.ua (last access: 22 October 2007).
3 According to independent surveys 44 percent of Ukrainians support improving 
relations with Russia, 30 percent of Ukrainians support improving relations with the EU.
Support for Ukraine's membership of NATO was expressed only 17.2 percent of
Ukrainians. In the east of Ukraine 67.6 percent of those asked do not support Ukraine's
membership of NATO. www.liga.kiev.ua (last access: 22 October 2007).
4 According to independent surveys, signing the EU–Ukraine Action Plan did not increase
public support for Ukraine joining the EU. From May 2005 till now only 
44 percent of Ukrainians support Ukraine joining the EU www.liga.kiev.ua (last access:
22 October 2007).
5 See below for details of the Ukrainian constitutional crisis of 2007.
6 Information from the web site of the Central Electoral Commission of Ukraine
<http://www.cvk.gov.ua> (last access: 31 October 2007).
7 See the Conclusions of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (Council of
Europe 1995).
8 On this see the document on the Compatibility of Ukrainian Law and Practice with the
Requirements of the European Conventions on Human Rights, Strasbourg, 2001
(HRCAD 2001, 4)
9 European institutions were very concerned about the delay in the ratification of the key
conventions, among them: Protocol No. 12 and No 14 for European Convention on
Human Rights, European Social Charter, European Convention on Citizenship, European
Convention on Trans-boundary Television, European Convention on Legal Status of
Migrant Workers. Available at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ListeTraites.asp?
CM=8&CL= ENG (last access: 31 October 2007).
13 See Human Rights in Ukraine, No. 34 ( 2004, 4–11).
14 For details see the discussion on draft laws at the web site of the Verhovna Rada of Ukraine
<http://www.rada.gov.ua> (last access: 31 October 2007).
16 See the Resolution of the Parliamentary Assembly of Council of Europe on
'Implementation of its Duties and Obligations by Ukraine on Acceding Council of
Europe' (Council of Europe 2003a).
17 On this our source is the provisional edition of the Resolution of the Parliamentary
Assembly of Council of Europe 'Functioning of democratic institutions in Ukraine' (see
Council of Europe 2007a).
18 See on this the Council of Europe Criminal Law Convention on Corruption on 1/07/2002
(Council of Europe 2002c) and Council of Europe Civil Law Convention on Corruption on
1/11/2003 (Council of Europe 2003b).
19 On this see article 2.1 (8) of the EU-Ukraine Action Plan. Recommendation No. 1/2005
of the EU–Ukraine Cooperation Council of 21/02/2005 on the implementation of the
EU/Ukraine Action Plan. 14 The Centre of Economic and Political Studies, named after
Razumkov <http://www.uceps.org/eng/show/335> (last access: 14 November 2007),
conducted a survey on the eve of parliamentary elections in Ukraine in March 2006.
Results showed that 42.2 percent of respondents were in favor of prioritizing relations
with the Russian Federation over relations with the EU. Only 25.4 percent of respondents
prioritized developing relations with the EU. At the same time 61.4 percent of respon-
dents were against joining NATO and 40.7 percent wanted Ukraine to obtain full
membership of the EU.
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